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Participants in the psychosurgery controversy generally espouse one of
three competing points of view. First, there are the surgeons who argue
that psychosurgical procedures have developed beyond the experimental
stage to the point where they may be considered therapeutic for certain
types of patients.' Second, there are those who support further research in
the area in the hope of developing genuinely therapeutic procedures, but
who recognize the importance of safeguarding against potential abuses in
the course of this development. 2 Finally, there are the anti-psychosurgeons,
who argue for the total prohibition of psychosurgery on ethical, spiritual,
or political grounds independent of its characterization as experimental or
therapeutic.
3
It is the~purpose of this article to examine this controversy from a legal
perspective with a view toward determining what legal control mechanisms
are presently available or should be created to ensure that the rights of the
patient and of society are adequately protected. For the purposes of this
discussion, the term "psychosurgery" will be used to mean any procedure
that destroys brain tissue for the primary purpose of modifying behavior.
4
* Director, Center for Law and Health Sciences, Boston University School of Law.
A.B., Harvard College, 1967; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1970; M.P.H., Harvard School of
Public Health, 1972.
Stal Attorney, Center for Law and Health Sciences, Boston University School of
Law. Boston University, A.B., 1970; J.D., 1973.
1 See, e.g., V. Mark & F. Ervin, Violence and the Brain (1970); Hearings on S. 974, S.
878 and S.J. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 348-57, 363-68 (remarks of Drs. Orlando Andy
and Robert Heath).
2 Hearings, supra note 1, at 338-47 (remarks of Dr. Bertram Brown, Director of the
National Institute of Mental Health).
3 Id. at 357-63 (remarks of Dr. Peter Breggin, presently Director of the Center for the
Study of Psychiatry).
4 Other definitions of psychosurgery follow:
Psychosurgery can best be defined as a surgical removal or destruction of brain tissue
or the cutting of brain tissue to disconnect one part of the brain from another, with
the intent of altering behavior, even though there may be no direct evidence of struc-
tural disease or damage in the brain.
Id. at 339 (remarks of Dr. Bertram Brown).
Psychosurgery is a term which has been loosely used to identify brain operations
performed for the treatment of behavioral and related neurological disorders.
Id. at 348 (remarks of Dr. Orlando Andy).
The definition of psychosurgery is to destroy normal brain tissue to control the emo-
tions or behavior or, a diseased tissue when the disease has nothing to do with be-
havior ... the man is trying to control.
Id. at 359 (remarks of Dr. Peter Breggin).
"Psychosurgery" means any operation designed to irreversibly lesion or destroy brain
tissue for the primary purpose of altering thoughts, emotions or behavior of a human
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The first procedure fitting this definition was the prefrontal lobotomy
developed by Egas Moniz in 1935. 5 It was first performed in the United
States in 1936, by Drs. Walter Freeman and James Watts of George Wash-
ington University. 6 Schizophrenic patients who had been habitually hos-
pitalized and who were irritable and helpless became, after the operation,
"quiet, more cooperative, clean, able to eat by themselves, capable of work-
ing in the hospital, and could even be sent home to their families." 7 In
addition, the patients lost their ability to solve simple problems, to reason
abstractly and to relate to their family members.8 It was the side effect of
extreme passivity,9 however, that eventually brought the procedure to the
attention of a criminal court.
In 1945, Millard Wright was arrested for 10 house-breakings and robberies
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Six weeks after his arrest, he refused to eat or
converse, seemed confused and apparently attempted suicide. He was there-
fore transferred to a hospital for the criminally insane until he was placed
on trial in 1947. At that time both Wright's lawyer and the local district
attorney requested that the defendant be lobotomized in an attempt to cure'
him of his criminal tendencies. The judge agreed, but upon Wright's return
to court two months after his lobotomy a different judge was presiding.
Both the surgeon and the defendant were eager to have an opportunity to
test the efficacy of the procedure, but the new judge was not convinced
being. "Psychosurgery" does not include procedures which may irreversibly lesion or
destroy brain tissues when undertaken to cure well-defined disease such as brain tumor,
epileptic foci and certain chronic pain syndromes.
Ch. 616, § 1(6) [1973 Ore. Reg. Sess.] (S. Bill 298), amending Ore. Rev. Stat. 677.190 (1971).
The term "psychosurgery" means those operations currently referred to as lobotomy,
psychiatric surgery, and behavioral surgery and all other forms of brain surgery if the
surgery is performed for the purpose of-
(A) modification of thoughts, feelings, actions, or behavior rather than the treat-
ment of a known and diagnosed physical disease of the brain;
(B) modification of normal brain function or normal brain tissue in order to con-
trol thoughts, feelings, action, or behavior; or
(C) treatment of abnormal brain function or abnormal brain tissue in order to
modify thoughts, feelings, actions, or behavior when the abnormality is not an estab-
lished cause for those thoughts, feelings, actions, or behavior. Such term does not in-
clude electroshock treatment, the electrical stimulation of the brain, or drug therapy,
except when substances are injected or inserted directly into brain tissue.
H.R. 5371, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1973).
For a discussion of the various types of psychosurgical procedures see Andy, Neurosur-
gical Treatment of Abnormal Behavior, 252 Am. J. Med. Sci. 232 (1966), reprinted in
Hearings, supra note 1, at 417. For another definition of psychosurgery see Stedman's
Medical Dictionary 1040 (22d ed. 1972).
5 The Age of Madness 157 (T. Szasz ed. 1973), reprinting in part Moniz, How I Came
to Perform Prefrontal Leucotomy, in Congress of Psychosurgery 7 (Lisboa: Edicoes Atica
1948).
6 Freeman, Frontal Lobotomy in Early Schizophrenia Long Follow-up in 415 Cases, 119
Brit. J. Psychiat. 621 (1971).
7 Goldstein, Prefrontal Lobotomy: Analysis and Warning, Scientific Am., Feb. 1950, at
44.
8 Id. at 46-47; Holden, Itil & Hofstatter, Prefrontal Lobotomy: Stepping-Stone or Pit-
fall?, 127 Am. J. Psychiat. 591 (1970).
9 Goldstein, supra note 7, at 46-47.
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that Wright should be allowed to go free. However, because of Wright's
demonstrated desire to help medical science, he received the comparatively
light sentence of two to 12 years instead of the possible 40 years to life.
Wright later committed suicide while in prison.10
In 1949, the Stanford Law Review addressed the problems involved in
drafting a statute to regulate the use of lobotomy and concluded that "the
greater good will be achieved by avoiding legislative fetters and relying for
protection on the high standards of the medical profession and the indi-
viduals who compose it."" The Soviet Union demonstrated its disagree-
ment with this conclusion by its prohibition of the performance of lobotomy
in 1951.12 As N. I. Oserezki, a Soviet psychiatrist, told the World Federation
of Mental Health, the procedure is "an anti-physiological method that
violates the principles of humanity [and] makes the patient an intellectual
invalid .... Through lobotomy, he argued, "an insane person is changed
into an idiot."'13 Arguing the contrary position in the United States, Drs.
Freeman and Watts wrote that "[i]t is better for the patient to have a
simplified intellect capable of elementary acts, than an intellect where there
reigns the disorder of subtle synthesis. Society can accommodate itself to
the most humble laborer, but it justifiably distrusts the mad thinker."'
14
Thus, Freeman was satisfied when he could reflect upon his operations and
comment that "[o]n the whole, lobotomized patients make rather good
citizens."1 5
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, psychosurgery was ignored by the legal
community. During this time, however, there existed and continued to de-
velop a general system of control over medical practice. It is to this system
that any attempt to regulate psychosurgery as a specific medical practice
must first turn.
III. LEGAL CONTROL OF MEDICAL PRACTICE
A. Private Actions
The best known course of action available to a dissatisfied patient is the
malpractice suit. 16 A psychosurgical patient might successfully sue for mal-
10 The case is discussed in Mayer, Prefrontal Lobotomy in the Courts, 38 J. Crim. L.C.
& P.S. 576 (1948). See also Silbermann & Ransohoff, Medico-Legal Problems in Psycho-
surgery, 110 Am. J. Psychiat. 801, 806 n.4 (1954); Time, July 14, 1947, at 53, col. 3.
11 Note, Lobotomy: Surgery for the Insane, 1 Stan. L. Rev. 463, 474 (1949).
12 Trotter, A Clockwork Orange in a California Prison, 101 Sci. News 174, 175 (1972).
13 Scientific Am., Oct. 1953, at 60. It is well-known, however, that the Soviet Union
continues to treat political dissidents as if they were insane. See, e.g., Chorover, Big
Brother and Psychotechnology, Psychology Today, Oct. 1973, at 43, 44.
14 Brown, Wienckowski & Bivens, Psychosurgery: Perspective on a Current Issue 3
(DHEW Pub. No. HSM 73-9119, 1973).
15 Silbermann & Ransohoff, supra note 10, at 808.
16 Although doctors argue that malpractice suits have reached crisis proportions, the
most recent statistics reveal that one suit is filed for every 226,000 doctor-patient en-
counters. Report of the Secretary's',Comm. on Medical Malpractice 12 (DHEW Pub. No.
OS 73-88, 1973). See also Dietz, Baird & Berul, The Medical Malpractice Legal System 97
(Appendix to DHEW Pub. No. OS 73-88, 1973).
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practice on any one of the following three grounds: (1) the performance of
the procedure was negligent; (2) the patient did not give informed consent
to the procedure; or (3) the method of review constituted negligence.
1. Negligent Performance of the Procedure
A claim that the performance of a psychosurgical procedure was negligent
may actually involve one or more of three individual questions: (1) what
procedure was used; (2) what were the qualifications of the person perform-
ing the procedure; and (3) was the chosen procedure performed without
negligence. Doctors have a legal duty to perform on at least the level of the
"average practitioner"'17 or, if they are specialists, on the level of the "aver-
age specialist."'I s If the violation of this duty results in injury to the patient,
he is entitled to compensation. Certainly this duty requires, at a minimum,
that the physician not employ discredited procedures. The classical lobot-
omy, as exemplified by the techniques of Dr. Walter Freeman, involved the
insertion of a device shaped like an ice pick into the patient's orbital cavity
while the patient was anesthetized through electro-shock treatment. This
device was then moved around within the cranial cavity to grossly cut
tissue.19 In view of the general agreement among contemporary surgeons
that the performance of the classical lobotomy is unjustifiable, it would
seem that any patient subjected to such a procedure should be successful in
a malpractice suit. As Dr. Bertram Brown, Director of the National Insti-
tute of Mental Health, has said: "I think I can state unequivocally that
no responsible scientist today would condone a classical lobotomy opera-
tion."20
More generally, of course, there is the question whether the performance
of any psychosurgical procedure is justified. Apart from the controversy
over the therapeutic value of psychosurgery, there is the further con-
sideration that the United States has an oversupply of 'neurosurgeons.
21
Thus, there is tremendous pressure on each neurosurgeon to justify his
specialization, a phenomenon that may generally lead to the performance
17 D. Harney, Medical Malpractice 91 (1973).
18 Id. at 116. See also Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968); McCoid,
The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 549 (1959): Note, The
Standard of Care in Malpractice Cases, 4 Osgoode Hall L.J. 222 (1966).
19 Freeman estimated that he had lobotomized more than 3,500 persons. Freeman,
supra note 6, at 622; see W. Freeman & J. Watts, Psychosurgery 51-57 (2d ed. 1950).
20 Hearings, supra note 1, at 340. According to the National Institute of Mental Health,
some lobotomized patients showed improvement, but the classical lobotomy was a
"therapy of desperation." Brown, Wienckowski & Bivens, supra note 14, at 2. See also
Scoville, Psychosurgery and Other Lesions of the Brain Affecting Human Behavior, in
Psychosurgery 5, 8 (E. Hitchcock, L. Laitinen & K. Vaernet eds. 1972); Sweet, Treatment
of Medically Intractable Mental Diseases by Limited Frontal Leucotomy-Justifiable?, 289
New Eng. J. Med. 1117 (1973).
21 See Bergland, Neurosurgery May Die, 288 New Eng. J. Med. 1043 (1973). The average
neurosurgeon in 1970 in the United States performed an average of only five or six major
operations per month. Id. at 1045, quoting Odom, Neurological Surgery in Our Changing
Times: The 1972 AANS Presidential Address, 37 J. Neurosurg. 255 (1972).
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of unnecessary surgery 22 and may be responsible for the expansion of indi-
cations for surgery. Indeed, psychosurgery has been performed to treat
homosexuality, 23 violent behavior 24 and marijuana use.25
Another avenue of attack relates to the psychosurgeon's professional
qualifications. The states license doctors to practice medicine, 26 but do not
directly oversee their work. Thus, if a licensed doctor can obtain an operat-
ing room, he may perform whatever form of surgery he desires even if he
has had no surgical training. Two-thirds of all the surgeons practicing in
the United States today are either certified by the American Board of'
Neurological Surgery or by a specialty board or are currently in training
leading to such certification. 27 The remaining one-third, however, are
self-designated surgeons. Dr. Walter Freeman, for example, was a, psy-
chiatrist.2 8 He disagreed with the view of his colleague Dr. James Watts
"that any procedure involving cutting of brain tissue is a major operation
and should remain in the hands of the neurological surgeon." 29 Freeman's
view notwithstanding, it would seem that the performance of psychosurgery
by any physician lacking either certification to perform neurosurgery or
equivalent training should constitute malpractice.
A psychosurgeon may also be negligent in the performance of the pro-
cedure. A recent case in Kentucky, for example, involved a surgeon who
missed the temporal lobe connections and destroyed the patient's optic
nerve instead. A settlement was reached out of court for a substantial but
undisclosed amount.
8 0
2. The Absence of Informed Consent
The concept of informed consent is presently being redefined by the
courts.31 This redefinition is designed to give the patient more power and to
22 See Gonzales v. Nork (Super. Ct., Sacramento County, Cal., Nov. 19, 1973) (awarding
$1.7 million in compensatory and $2 million in punitive damages against a doctor who
performed an unnecessary laminectomy); Bunker, Surgical Manpower: A Comparison of
Operations and Surgeons in the United States and in England and Wales, 282 New Eng. J.
Med. 135 (1970); Lewis, Variations in the Incidence of Surgery, 281 New Eng. J. Med. 880
(1969); Vayda, A Comparison of Operations and Surgeons in the United States and Eng-
land and Wales, 289 New Eng. J. Med. 1224 (1973); Comment, Unnecessary Surgery: Doc-
tor and Hospital Liability, 61 Geo. L.J. 807 (1973).
23 Shoemaker, Operation to Relieve Perversion, 97 Sci. News 50 (1970).
24 V. Mark & F. Ervin, supra note 1, at 69-91.
25 Hearings, supra note 1, at 368; Trotter, Psychosurgery, the-Courts and Congress, 103
Sci. News 310, 311 (1973).
26 See W. Curran & E. Shapiro, Law, Medicine, and Forensic Science 522 (2d ed. 1970);
see, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, §§ 2 et seq. (1965).
27 Child, Surgical Intervention, Scientific Am., Sept. 1973, at 98. There are presently
1,500 certified neurosurgeons and 600 in specialty training in neurosurgery. Bergland,
supra note 21, at 1044. Prior to taking the Board examination, an applicant must have
completed one year's training in general surgery, a minimum of four years graduate study
in neurological surgery and two years of independent practice in neurological surgery.
Directory of Medical Specialists 603-04 (15th ed. 1972).
28 See Trotter, supra note 12, at 174; cf. W. Freeman & J. Watts, supra note 19, at x.
29 Id.
80 Hearings, supra note I, at 384.
31 See Karchmer, Informed Consent: A Plaintiff's Medical Malpractice "Wonder Drug,"
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thereby equalize the doctor-patient relationship, a development consistent
with judicial innovation in the landlord-tenant, 32 seller-buyer,3 3 employer-
employee,3 4 creditor-debtor,3 5 warden-prisoner3 6 and police-suspect 37 areas.
Medical treatment in the absence of consent has traditionally been regarded
as a battery, a touching by the doctor not consented to by the patient.38
More recently, the courts have begun to find an affirmative duty on the part
of the physician to inform the patient of the risks involved in a suggested
procedure and the available alternatives. A breach of this duty may form
the basis of a suit for negligence.3 9
Since 1972, certain courts have gone even further by holding that expert
testimony is not required to define the duty of disclosure. The emphasis,
instead, is on the patient's perception of his situation.40 In the words of one
court, "the patient's right of self-decision is the measure of the physician's
duty to reveal . . . . [and] the test for determining whether a potential
peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision. "41 Em-
ploying this perspective, a leading case has held a doctor liable for not
disclosing to the patient that laminectomy carries a one percent risk of
paralysis. 42 There seems to be almost uniform agreement that the risks of
psychosurgery are not fully known and that they are therefore unquantifi-
31 Mo. L. Rev. 29 (1966); Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11 Clev.-
Mar. L. Rev. 249 (1962); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 628 (1970); Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-
Patient Relationship, 79 Yale L.J. 1533 (1970); Comment, Informed Consent in Medical
Malpractice, 55 Calif. L. Rev. 1396 (1967).
32 See, e.g., Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 339, 293
N.E.2d 831.
33 See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
34 See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); Labor-Management Relations Act
of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1970).
35 See, e.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
386 See D. Rudovsky, The Rights of Prisoners (1973).
37 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
38 W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 32, at 165 (4th ed. 1971).
39 D. Harney, supra note 17, at 83; W. Prosser, supra note 38; Annas, Informed Con-
sent: When Good Medicine May Not Be Good Law, 1 Medicolegal News 3 (1973). See,
e.g., Wilkenson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
40 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972);
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Fogal v. Genesee
Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973); Wilkenson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295
A.2d 676 (1972); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973). But see
Tatro v. Lukin, 512 P.2d 529 (Kan. 1973).
41 Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972),
citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
42 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
Accord, Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967) (failure to disclose one percent risk of
loss of hearing in a stapedectomy). See also Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82
(8th Cir. 1966) (duty of drug manufacturer to warn doctors of the possibility of serious
side effects in a small percentage of patients); Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp.
991 (D.N.D. 1966), afJ'd, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969) (duty of drug manufacturer to give
adequate warning of small percentage of risk in case involving first reported incidence of
injury).
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able. 43 Thus, a patient's consent to psychosurgery could not be informed
unless he were aware of the dangers that have been documented, the fact
that unknown side effects may develop and the possibility of death.
Additional problems are introduced when the patient's competency is
called into question. Arguably, no patient who can be considered a candi-
date for psychosurgery is capable of giving informed consent to the pro-
cedure because, in the physician's view, his brain is either damaged or
malfunctioning. In such cases, the law usually gives the patient's legal
guardian the power to consent to treatment,4 4 but recent cases have made
it clear that there are limits to the exercise of proxy consent. For example,
parents have been required to obtain court approval for their consent to
kidney45 and bone marrow 46 transplants involving healthy minor siblings
who act as donors.
Dr. Peter Breggin, perhaps this country's most ardent opponent of psycho-
surgery, claims that psychosurgery is no more "a medical procedure ...
than the mutilation of an arm as punishment of a crime is a medical prg-
cedure." 47 This argument has legal implications because neither individuals
nor their legal guardians may consent to a procedure that may be considered
a maim or mutilation.48 The ancient rationale for this rule was the king's
right to the aid of his subjects. The rule survives, however, due to the
state's interest in maintaining the health of its citizens. Maiming is therefore
analogous to murder in that consent on the part of the victim is not a valid
defense.4 9 In the modern case of State v. Bass,50 for example, a doctor was
convicted as an accessory before the fact to the crime of mayhem for an-
43 See Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW, slip op. at
16 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973); Edson, The Psyche and the Surgeon,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1973, § 6, pt. 1 (Magazine), at 14, 88-89. In one series, however, Dr.
Walter Freeman reported eight deaths in 415 patients, or a two percent mortality rate.
Freeman, supra note 6, at 622.
44 See J. Waltz & F. Inbau, Medical Jurisprudence 172 (1971).
45 See Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Super. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972); Howard v. Fuiton-
DeKalb Hosp. Authority, 42 U.S.L.W. 2322 (Ga. Super. Ct., Nov. 29, 1973); Stiunk v.
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969). Three unreported Massachusetts decisions are discussed
in Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
891 (1959).
46 See Smith v. Smith, Eq. No. 43919 (Md. Cir. Ct., July 14, 1972); Camitta v. Fager,
Eq. No. 73-171 (Mass., Sept. 5, 1973).
47 Hearings, supra note 1, at 359.
48 See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *205; Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 268 (1962).
49 See State v. Bass, 255 N.C. 42, 46-47, 120 S.E.2d 580, 583 (1961). Cf. Physical Manipu-
lation of the Brain, Hastings Center Report 7 (Special Supp., May 1973) (remarks of Dr.
Robert Michels):
Does a person have the right to informedly consent to anything that might be done to
him? Suicide raises the question most clearly. Does the individual have the moral,
legal, ethical, or social right to kill himself if he fully understands the nature and
meaning of his act and weighs the consequences thereof? Our law says no. Well, if
you can't kill yourself, can you cut out 98 percent of your brain? Or 97 percent? Or
0.38 percent? Where is the line? If you can't kill yourself to relieve pain, can you
destroy your essential humanity to relieve pain? What are the limits of essential hu-
manity? Are there any? Does the concept mean anything?
50 255 N.C. 42, 120 S.E.2d 580 (1961).
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esthetizing the fingers of an individual who desired to amputate them to
obtain insurance proceeds. The actual amputation was performed by the
individual when the doctor refused to perform the procedure himself.
The argument could be made that psychosurgery, like the amputation
in Bass, involves the removal of nonpathological tissue and thus constitutes
the common law crime of mayhem. The counterargument would be that
psychosurgery may be performed for the sound medical purpose of alleviat-
ing aberrant behavior. However, there are more direct ways to modify
behavior. Should the result in Bass have been different if the patient sought
the removal of his fingers to render himself incapable of using a gun
during periods of violence? Alternatively, should the result have been
different if, instead of aiding the amputation of the patient's fingers, the
defendant had paralyzed them through a neurological procedure?
The paralysis or removal of portions of an individual's brain in an
antiseptic and highly sophisticated operating room has seemed so far
removed from the early mayhem cases that the analogy has rarely been
mentioned more than in passing.51 Although this mayhem argument would
not apply to those psychosurgical operations that involve an underlying
brain pathology, it would cover the removal or destruction of healthy brain
tissue for the sole purpose of modifying behavior. Whether or not liability
should follow directly from this analogy, it is certainly compelling enough
to indicate that stringent safeguards must be instituted to protect patients
before psychosurgical procedures are performed. The current emphasis on
such protective procedures suggests yet another ground for a malpractice
action.
3. Negligence in the Method of Review
(a) Absence of Review. A successful suit for negligence must rest on the
breach of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Such duties are
often based on the standard of the reasonable man which, in turn, often
refers to what is the "usual and customary conduct of others under similar
circumstances . , . ."52 The current absence of psychosurgery review com-
mittees in almost all hospitals is not, however, dispositive of the negligence
issue. Indeed, as Judge Learned Hand wrote in the leading case of The
T. J. Hooper:53
[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but
strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly
lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It never may set
its own tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end
say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even
their universal disregard will not excuse their omission. 54
51 See Kidd, Limits of the Right of a Person to Consent to Experimentation on Himself,
117 Science 211, 212 (1953); Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 99,
116 (1967).
52 W. Prosser, supra note 38, § 33, at 166.
53 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
54 Id. at 740.
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Thus, a tug boat company was held negligent for not having radio com-
munications aboard even though it was acting in conformance with the
prevailing standards within the industry. This rationale has also been em-
ployed to hold a hospital liable for its failure to ensure that a general
practitioner call in an orthopedic consultant in a particular case, although
such supervision was not customary. 55 In light of the known dangers in-
volved in psychosurgical practice, courts would be justified in imposing
upon hospitals where psychosurgery is performed a duty to provide ex-
haustive scientific and lay review even though such procedures are not as
yet ,customary.56
. (b) Inadequate Review. If there is an established review committee, it
may be liable for negligence in the performance of its duties. 57 If it could
be demonstrated that a committee breached a duty to protect the interests
of prospective psychosurgical candidates by allowing the operation to be
performed on inappropriate subjects, the committee itself as well as the
hospital may be liable under traditional negligence -theory.
The one court case involving psychosurgery, Kaimowitz v. Department
of Mental Health,5s may provide a specific illustration of negligence on the
part of review committee members. One member of the review committee
in that case failed to attend any of the meetings relating to the proposed
surgery on the plaintiff. It was his view that:
As a layman I am unqualified to comment on any of the technical
aspects which are involved in the project. Therefore we must all trust
the good intentions and technical competence of the Hospital Mfedical
Committee, psychologists, psychiatrists, neurologists, etc. who have re-
viewed and evaluated John Doe's case.59
55 Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
56 A federal court has imposed sterilization guidelines on Alabama state-run institutions.
Included in the guidelines is the requirement of approval of the procedures by a steriliza-
tion review committee which must include a patient from the institution, a doctor, a
lawyer, at least two women, and two minority group members. Med. World News, Feb. 1,
1974, at 4.
The authors are aware of the existence of only two psychosurgery review committees.
One has been established in Oregon under statutory mandate, see text accompanying note
88 infra, and the other has been established at the request of the Board of Trustees at
Boston City Hospital. See note 109 and accompanying text infra. However, the medical
community is familiar with the use of review committees in other contexts. See Dagi, The
Ethical Tribunal in Medicine, 54 B.U.L. Rev. 268 (1974); Kayes, Selection of Recipients
and Donors for Renal Transplantation, 123 Arch. Inter. Med. 511 (1969); Mishkin, Multi-
disciplinary Review for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical Research: Past
and Prospective HEW Policy, 54 B.U.L. Rev. 278 (1974); Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic
Abortion: A Problem in Law and Medicine, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 417 (1959); Rostenberg, The
Ethics and Sociology of Peer Review, 27 J. Am. Med. Womens Ass'n 318 (1972); Slee,
Streamlining the Tissue Committee, 44 Bull. Am. College of Surgeons 518 (1959).
57 Cf. Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
58 Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
59 Letter from Frank Moran, Complaint, exhibit F, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental
Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
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If it was clear to this committee member what his responsibilities were, then
such evasion of them is morally unjustifiable. And if, as appears necessary
for responsible action on their part, a duty to protect the patient is imposed
on such committees, such inaction would constitute its breach.60
B. Public Actions
1. The Need for Regulation
Before a new drug is put on the market, the manufacturer is required to
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Food and Drug Administration that
it is both safe and effective.6 ' If one wishes to experiment with a new
surgical technique, however, no prior approval from a governmental or
professional agency is generally needed before its use is promoted. The
history of heart transplant procedures illustrates the absence of regulation
over surgical innovation. The first human heart transplant was performed
in South Africa on December 3, 1967.2 In a race to match this performance,
more than 100 transplants were performed within the following year.63 The
fad ended rather quickly, however, because of the operation's high cost
and low success rate. Both the initiation of the craze and its demise were
governed solely by the actions of individual surgeons.
The growth of psychosurgical practice has taken place in much the same
fashion. Psychosurgeons reporting their own results on their own scales
have claimed amazing rates of success.64 Although these self-evaluated
"before and after" studies reveal some of the dangers involved, their
anecdotal nature destroys their utility for the purpose of determining
whether psychosurgery is a therapeutic medical procedure. A review of
the medical literature reveals only two well-designed retrospectively con-
trolled studies of psychosurgery, both of which conclude that lobotomy does
not improve one's chances of leaving a mental institution. 65 The only
prospective case-controlled studies that exist support the efficacy of psycho-
surgery in only the most limited of ways. 66 Finally, there are no controlled
*60 The committee's duty would be derived from its purpose of protecting the prospective
patient. It could be established by legislation, judicial declaration, hospital policy, the
promulgation of regulations, or standards of professional organizations. To encourage their
active participation, committee members should be reimbursed for their expenses and
should receive some compensation for their time.
61 For a detailed discussion of the law in this area see H. Toulmin, A Treatise on the
Law of Foods, Drugs & Cosmetics (2d ed. 1963).
62 T. Thompson, Hearts 278 (1971).
63 Id. at 278-90.
64 In one study, Freeman and Watts reported that 45 percent of their patients had good
results, 33 percent were fair and 19 percent were poor. W. Freeman & J. Watts, supra note
19, at 494. In a later study, Freeman reported that 87 percent of the patients were able to
leave the hospital. Sixty-five percent of this group were considered successes because of
their ability to be employed or keep house. The other 22 percent live in a "state of idle
dependency" either at home or in a nursing institution. Freeman, supra note 6, at 623. For
a discussion of other studies showing high success rates see Sweet, supra note 20.
65 McKenzie & Kaczanowski, Prefrontal Leukotomy: A Five-Year Controlled Study, 91
Can. Med. Assoc. J. 1193 (1964); Robin, A Controlled Study of the Effects of Leucotomy,
21 J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiat. 262 (1958).
66 Marks, Birley & Gelder, Modified Leucotomy in Severe Agoraphobia: A Controlled
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studies of the more modern forms of psychosurgery such as amygdalectomy
and cingulotomy.
67
Dr. Henry Beecher has demonstrated the importance of such controlled
studies in the evaluation of surgical techniques. 68 His research presents
convincing evidence that there is a placebo effect in surgery comparable to
that in drug therapy. In a prospectively controlled study of ligation of the
mammary artery to relieve angina, for example, it was discovered that
those receiving placebo surgery-that is, an incision was made, the artery
was located but not ligate, and then the incision was closed-improved in
clinical and objective terms as much as those receiving the actual mammary
ligation. Also citing other studies of surgical treatments now in disrepute,
Beecher was able to suggest that the placebo effect in surgery is approxi-
mately 35 percent.
Beecher also discovered other relevant variables affecting the "success"
of placebo operations. These variables included the patient's frame of
mind, usually one of stress due to pain or illness, and the relative en-
thusiasm of the surgeon for the procedure. Thus, in a study of gastro-
enterostomies for the treatment of duodenal ulcers, for example, skeptical
surgeons obtained only half as many cures and 20 times as many marginal
ulcers as did the enthusiasts.
These studies are particularly relevant to the debate over the efficacy of
psychosurgical procedures. First, the candidate for psychosurgery is likely
to be strongly motivated toward recovery. Second, the surgeons currently
performing psychosurgery are enthusiasts who strongly believe in the ability
of their procedures to alleviate symptoms.6 9 Finally, the placebo effect is
Serial Inquiry, 112 Brit. J. Psychiat. 757 (1966); Tan, Marks & Marset, Bimedial Leucotomy
in Obsessive-Compulsive Neurosis: A Controlled Serial Enquiry, 118 Brit. J. Psychiat. 155
(1971). Dr. William H. Sweet has argued that one "carefully designed and executed" pros-
pective study of lobotomy revealed significant beneficial results. Sweet, supra note 20, at
1118, citing Ball, Klett & Gresock, The Veterans Administration Study of Prefrontal Lo-
botomy, 20 J. Clin. Exp. Psychopathol. Q. Rev. Psychiat. Neurol. 205 (1959). However,
Sweet neglects to point out the following: (1) the study disclosed no significant differences
between the two groups in years one, two, three and five, id. at 208; (2) the lobotomized
patients were more compliant, submissive and self-deprecating than the controls, id.;
(3) almost half of the 373 patients were lost during the five-year evaluation period, id.;
(4) the method used to match the controls was not discussed; (5) all conclusions relating
to discharged patients were made on the basis of only 27 lobotomized patients and 18 con-
trols, id.; and (6) the researchers evaluating the results were aware of which patients had
been lobotomized and which had not, id. at 214.
67 Sweet, supra note 20.
68 Beecher, Surgery as Placebo, 176 J.A.M.A. 1102 (1961). See Beecher, Evidence for In-
creased Effectiveness of Placebos with Increased Stress, 187 Am. J. Physiol. 163 (1956);
Cobb, Thomas, Dillard, Meredino & Bruce, An Evaluation of Internal-Mammary-Artery
Ligation by a Double-Blind Technic, 260 New Eng. J. Med. 1115 (1959); Dimond, Kittle &
Crockett, Comparison of Internal Mammary Artery Ligation and Sham Operation for An-
gina Pectoris, 5 Am. J. Cardiol. 483 (1960). But see Livingston, Cingulate Cortex Isola-
tion for the Treatment of Psychoses and Psychoneurosis, 31 Psychiatric Treatment: Pro-
ceedings of the Association for Research on Nervous and Mental Diseases, 374, 377 (1953)
(reports four placebo cingulotomies that had no effect upon patient behavior).
69 See, e.g., Psychosurgery (E. Hitchcock, L. Laitinen & K. Vaernet eds. 1972).
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particularly prevalent when subjective, psychological states rather than
pathological entities are being treated. Thus, when Dr. Orlando Andy
estimates his own success rate at 19 percent, 70 the efficacy of his procedures
is called into serious question because one might anticipate even better
results on the basis of the placebo effect alone.
2. Modest Beginnings
The absence of reliable medical data suggests that independent review
of psychosurgical practice is required. Under present government policy,
psychosurgeons' protocols are reviewed only when they are funded by
grants or contracts from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) or when
the facility in which their studies are being conducted receive such funds.71
Although these categories may seem rather inclusive, most psychosurgeons
in the United States operate on patients outside the framework of an
experimental design. 72 Thus, for example, Dr. Thomas Ballantine of the
Massachusetts General Hospital regularly performs cingulotomies for de-
pression, anxiety states, obsessional neurosis and intractable pain without
independent review of either his surgical protocols or his consent pro-
cedures.73 Dr. Orlando Andy also used to operate without committee re-
view, but in the summer of 1973 the University of Mississippi Medical
Center, through its Human Investigation Committee, decided that his
surgery is basically investigative and experimental. Accordingly, a mora-
torium was imposed upon his performance of phychosurgery until an ac-
ceptable research protocol is submitted to the Committee.7 4
Even this limited form of institutional review is a relatively new develop-
ment. It was not until 1966 that NIH first promulgated a policy requiring
such review for the purpose of determining whether (1) the rights and
welfare of individual patients were protected, (2) informed consent was pro-
cured, and (3) the potential medical benefits either to the patient or to
society outweighed the risks of the suggested procedure.75 But since the
70 National Broadcasting Co., Should Man Play God? (Educational Enterprises Docu-
mentary Film, 1973).
71 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Institutional Guide to DHEW Policy on
Protection of Human Subjects 1 (1971). As of March 31, 1973, however, the federal govern-
ment is no longer funding any clinical psychosurgery. Hearings, supra note 1, at 344 (re-
marks of Dr. Bertram Brown, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health). See also
N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1974, at 54, col. 1.
72 Cf. Hearings, supra note 1, at 343.
73 Ballantine, Cassidy, Brodeur & Giriunas, Frontal Cingulotomy for Mood Disturbance,
in Psychosurgery, supra note 69, at 221. During the past year, Dr. Ballantine's patients
have been evaluated by a psychiatrist and a neurologist, usually the day before surgery is
scheduled to be performed.
74 Memorandum from Dr. Albert Breland, Chairman, to the Committee on Surgical
Therapy of Behavioral Disorders, Aug. 27, 1973 (on file at Center for Law and Health
Sciences, Boston University School of Law).
75 Curran, Governmental Regulation of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Re-
search: The Approach of Two Federal Agencies, 98 Daedalus 542, 578 (1969). Cf. U.S.
Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, supra note 71, at 5-8.
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required review committees could be composed solely of doctors, 76 NIH
policy promoted merely another form of peer review, a mechanism of
control that has generally proven ineffective.
7
Thus, until 1973, patients could protect their rights only through tra-
ditional malpractice actions while the medical profession was allowed to
police itself. During the past year, however, significant new steps have been
taken toward the regulation of psychosurgery.
IV. LEGAL RESPONSES
A. Judicial Action
The only case that has addressed the current issues in the psychosurgery
debate is Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health.7 8 Although this lower
court opinion has no binding precedential effect in Michigan or any other
jurisdiction, it is likely to influence future judicial and legislative activity
if only because it is the first judicial pronouncement in this area.
In 1972, two psychiatrists at the Lafayette Clinic sought and obtained
state funds to study the effects of amygdalotomy and cyproterone acetate, an
anti-androgen, on male aggression in institutional settings.. The study
protocol was approved both by a scientific review committee and by a
multidisciplinary "human rights committee." Twenty-four candidates were
originally sought, but only one, Louis Smith, was considered suitable. For
17 years he had been confined in a Michigan state hospital as a criminal
sexual psychopath after being charged with murder and rape. The re-
searchers presented Smith and his parents a detailed consent form, which
they both signed.
79
76 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, supra note 71, at 4.
77 Compare id. with U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, National Institutes of
Health, Protection of Human Subjects, Policies and Procedures, 38 Fed. Reg. 31738, 31741
(1973).
78 Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973). The case is
discussed in greater detail in Comment, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health: A
Right to Be Free from Experimental Psychosurgery?, 54 B.U.L Rev. 301 (1974).
79 The form reads:
Since conventional treatment efforts over a period of several years have not enabled
me to control my outbursts of rage and anti-social behavior, I submit an application
to be a subject in a research project which may offer me a form of effective therapy.
This therapy is based upon the idea that episodes of anti-social rage and sexuality
might be triggered by a disturbance in certain portions of my brain. I understand
that in order to be certain that a significant brain disturbance exists, which might
relate to my anti-social behavior, an initial operation will have to be performed. This
procedure cbnsists of placing fine wires into my brain, which will record the electrical
activity from those structures which play a part in anger and sexuality. These elec-
trical waves can then be studied to determine the presence of an abnormality.
In addition electrical stimulation with weak currents passed through these wires
will be done in order to find out if one or several points in the brain can trigger my
episodes of violence or unlawful sexuality. In other words this stimulation may cause
me to want to commit an aggressive or sexual act, but every effort will be made to
have a sufficient number of people present to control me. If the brain disturbance is
limited to a small area, I understand that the investigators will destroy this part of
my brain with an electrical current. If the abnormality comes from a larger part of
my brain, I agree that it should be surgically removed, if the doctors determine that
it can be done so, without risk of side effects. Should the electrical activity from the
parts of my brain into which the wires have been placed reveal that there is no sig-
nificant abnormality the wires will simply be withdrawn.
I realize that any operation on the brain carries a number of risks which may be
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However, before the researchers were able to proceed with the implanta-
tion of electrodes, the Medical Committee on Human Rights filed a petition
on behalf of Smith and similarly situated patients challenging the proposed
research. It was ultimately discovered that Smith was being held unconsti-
tutionally, and he was therefore ordered to be released. 80 In addition,
publicity resulting from the case led the state's Department of Mental
Health to withdraw its approval of the project. Nevertheless, a three-judge
panel decided that the question involved was likely to arise again and
proceeded to determine whether involuntarily confined individuals could
ever legally consent to experimental brain surgery designed to ameliorate
aggressive behavior.
After evaluating, with the help of expert testimony, the risks and po-
tential benefits of the proposed procedure, the court concluded:
there is no scientific basis for establishing that the removal or destruc-
tion of an area of the limbic brain would have any direct therapeutic
effect in controlling aggressivity or improving tormenting personal
behavior, absent the showing of a well defined clinical syndrome such
as epilepsy.8 '
On the other hand, however, the known risks to the physical and mental
condition of the patient were great, including loss of reasoning ability and
memory and general apathy.8 2 In light of this evidence, the court felt that
psychosurgery must be regarded as highly experimental.
Proceeding to the question of consent, the court cited the entire text of
the Nuremburg Code83 and concluded that the inherently coercive atmos-
phere of lengthy institutionalization so greatly diminishes an individual's
capacity to make a reasoned and voluntary decision about an experimental
and irreversible surgical procedure that it is impossible to give legally valid
consent in such circumstances.
8 4
Although the case is an important victory for proponents of the regula-
tion of psychosurgery, the court's reasoning seems contradictory. On the
one hand, the court emphasized the effects of institutionalization on the
capacity of the patient to give informed and voluntary consent. On the
other hand, however, it limited its holding to experimental situations. If
amygdalotomy were to be considered an accepted neurosurgical practice,
the involuntarily detained mental patient could, in the court's view, give
slight, but could be potentially serious. These risks include infection, bleeding, tem-
porary or permanent weakness or paralysis of one or more of my legs or arms, diffi-
culties with speech and thinking, as well as the ability to feel, touch, pain and tem-
perature. Under extraordinary circumstances, it is also possible that I might not
survive the operation.
Fully aware of the risks detailed in 'the paragraphs above, I authorize the physicians
of Lafayette Clinic and Providence Hospital to perform the procedures as outlined
above.
Civil No. 73-19434-AW, slip op. at 4 n.5 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
80 Id. at 6.
81 Id. at 17-18.
82 Id. at 17.
83 Id. at 23-24.
84 Id. at 31.
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legally adequate consent to the performance of the procedure on his brain.8 5
The nonexperimental status of a procedure may increase the prospective
patient's knowledge concerning the risks and benefits involved, but it in no
way counteracts the effects of institutionalization on his ability to consent
in a truly informed fashion.
The case also raises serious questions concerning the efficacy of both
scientific and human rights review committees. In Kaimowitz, such com-
mittees approved the protocol, but failed to maintain sufficient supervision
to cancel the study when only one appropriate subject could be found. At
least one member of the multidisciplinary committee personally inter-
viewed Smith to determine the voluntariness and competency of his consent.
Smith did, in fact, assure that member of his willingness to participate in
the experiment, but upon his release from custody he withdrew his pre-
viously given consent.8 6 It is therefore questionable whether even well-
meaning human rights committees can adequately evaluate the coercive
effect of institutionalization on prospective candidates for controversial
procedures. The promotion of such mechanisms of review in this context
may only provide false comfort to our consciences.
B. Legislative Action
The state legislature of Oregon has already enacted a statute regulating
the performance of psychosurgery in that state.87 The statute provides that
psychosurgery may be performed only with the affirmative vote of at least
six members of a state-wide nine-member review board.8 8 The function of
this panel is to determine, according to statutory guidelines, whether the
consent of the patient or his legal guardian is "informed" and "voluntary"
and whether the proposed procedure is "appropriate treatment for the
specific patient."8 9
However, the provisions of the statute are insensitive to certain problems
raised by psychosurgery. At least a majority and as many as seven members of
the nine-member board may be physicians. 90 Only one need be an attorney
and only one is designated as a "member of the general public." 9' The
board is thus heavily biased toward the scientific research community and
may approve the performance of psychosurgery even against the dissent of
all the "lay" members.
Another problem with the statute relates to the nature of the hearing.
If the patient has a legal guardian, the board is required to review only
85 Id. at 40.
86 Id. at 29-30 n.23.
87 Ch. 616 [1973 Ore. Reg. Sess.] (S. Bill 298), amending Ore. Rev. Stat. 677.190 (1971).
The entire statute is reprinted as an appendix to Atkins & Lauriat, Psychosurgery and the
Role of Legislation, 54 B.U.L. Rev. 288 (1974).
88 Ch. 616, § 3(4) [1973 Ore. Reg. Sess.] (S. Bill 298), amending Ore. Rev. Stat. 677.190
(1971).
89 Id. § 8(1).
90 Id. § 3.
91 Id. § 3(f).
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the consent of the guardian and the appropriateness of the proposed pro-
cedure. The patient himself need not testify, and the board may approve
the procedure even if the prospective patient specifically opposes it.92
Unlike Kaimowitz, then, the statute can be read to sanction the perform-
ance of psychosurgery on a nonconsenting, involuntarily committed mental
patient under guardianship so long as six of the nine board members
approve. It seems certain that the sponsors of the statute were responding
to the emerging concept of the "right to treatment" in allowing this result.
But, as Wyatt v. Stickney9 3 made clear, involuntarily committed mental
patients are entitled to "a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve
[their] mental condition."9 4 Moreover, the Wyatt court has specifically
addressed the problem of psychosurgery in the following manner:
Patients have a right not to be subjected to treatment procedures
such as lobotomy, electro-convulsive treatment, adversive reinforce-
ment conditioning or other unusual or hazardous treatment procedures
without their express and informed consent after consultation with
counsel or interested party of the patient's choice.95
In its attdmpt to establish a unified approach to psychosurgery, the
Oregon legislature oversimplified the problems of consent by failing to
make any distinctions among voluntarily or involuntarily confined mental
patients, prisoners, children or competent adults. Finally, a lawyer need
not be appointed for any class of patients unless one is affirmatively re-
quested.96 This choice or oversight substantially weakens the protection
provided by the statute to the mentally disabled.
The psychosurgery controversy has also captured the attention of federal
legislators. Senator J. Glenn Beall, Jr., for example, has introduced legisla-
tion calling for a two-year moratorium on the use of federal funds and
facilities for projects involving psychosurgery.97 During this time, the Secre-
tary of Health, Education and Welfare would be required to compile and
analyze the available data and present to Congress his views and recom--
mendations concerning the appropriate use of such procedures. a8
Representativ6 Louis Stokes has introduced a bill that would prohibit
all forms of psychosurgery designed to alter behavior from being per-
formed in federally connected health care facilities.99 The performance of
such procedures in violation of this legislation would subject doctors and
institutions to fines of up to $10,000 per operation to be assessed by a psy-
92 Id. § 7.
93 The developments in this case are reported at 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); 334
F. Supp. 1341 (1971); 344 F. Supp. 373 (1972).
94 325 F. Supp. at 784 (emphasis added).
95 344 F. Supp. at 380.
96 Ch. 616, § 11 [1973 Ore. Reg. Sess.] (S. Bill 298), amending Ore. Rev. Stat. 677.190
(1971).
97 S.J. Res. 86, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
98 Id. § 2.
99 H.R. 5371, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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chosurgery commission.10 0 The bill would, in addition, open the district
courts to civil actions by patients.1' 1 Finally, violators of the proposed
statute would be barred from receiving any government contracts, grants
or loans for a period of five years.
102
The statute most likely to be enacted has been introduced by Senator
Edward Kennedy and has already passed the Senate. 03 It covers human
experimentation in general but specifically calls for. the establishment of a
commission for the purpose of studying psychosurgery. In the meantime,
however, no moratorium on its practice would be imposed.
C. 'Administrative Action
In response to intense congressional and public pressure, the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) has recently proposed signifi-
cant modifications of its currently required review of human research. On
October 9, 1973, DHEW proposed that all institutional review committees
be composed of "not less than five persons with varying backgrounds."'
10 4
If promulgated as currently proposed, the regulations would require the
committees to be composed in a manner enabling them "to determine the
acceptability of the [research] proposal in terms of the organization's com-
mitments and regulations, applicable law, standards of professional conduct
and practice, and community attitudes.'
10 5
In addition, NIH, the component of DHEW that sponsors most of its
research on human beings at risk, has proposed changes in the review
process relating to experiments on children, prisoners or the mentally
infirm. 106 Essentially, these proposed regulations establish two additional
committees to pass upon particular research proposals. Each DHEW agency
would be required to appoint an Ethical Review Board to consider
"ethical issues and questions of societal acceptability in relation to scientific
value."'107 The institution at which the research is being conducted would
be responsible for the creation of a Protection Committee whose function
it would be to oversee the selection of subjects, monitor their continued
willingness to participate and intervene on their behalf if necessary.' 08
It is important to note that however significant such administrative
action is, it fails to reach directly most of the psychosurgery currently being
performed in the United States. On the other hand, however, if such pro-
cedures are widely adopted by hospitals and mental institutions, they may
100 Id. § 3(a)(1).
101 Id. § 3(c)(1).
102 Id. § 3(d).
103 S. 2071 & S. 2072, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). In the House of Representatives the
bill is H.R. 7724, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
104 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Protection of Human Subjects: Proposed
Policy, 38 Fed. Reg. 27882, 27883 (1973).
105 Id.
106 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, supra note 77.
107 Id. at 31741.
108 Id. at 31741-42.
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establish a new standard of care binding on operations performed in non-
research settings as well. It was with such a potential development in
mind, in addition to pressure from the community, that the Trustees of
Boston City Hospital established a multidisciplinary review committee to
review candidates for psychosurgery. 10 9
V. CONCLUSION: THE REFINEMENT OF LEGAL RESPONSES
Dr. Franz Ingelfinger has argued that informed consent is not meaning-
ful in the hospital setting because of the control doctors exercise over their
patients. In his view, "the subject's only real protection . . . depends on
the conscience and compassion of the investigator and his peers."110
Although our society has been willing to rely on this form of protection in
the past, recent developments in medical technology and an increasing
awareness of past abuses have made imperative the establishment of more
stringent safeguards. Community sensibilities will no longer allow, for
example, the unregulated research of scientists who respond to suggestions
concerning the special nature of the human brain as opposed to other
organs with the argument that "[t]he inviolability of the brain is only a
social construct, like nudity.""'
One of the law's responses to this dilemma has been to enlarge the con-
cept of informed consent by compelling the physician to disclose all in-
formation necessary for the patient to become meaningfully involved in the
decision-making process. This development, coupled with the increased
frequency of malpractice litigation, has prompted doctors to call for no-
fault malpractice insurance and for binding arbitration of malpractice
claims. 112 However, the medical profession's demonstrated inability to police
itself in controversial areas like psychosurgery suggests that malpractice
litigation must be retained as the consumer's only available method of con-
trolling the quality of medical care.
Another response that has been proposed and that deserves further ex-
perimentation is the involvement of community representatives and non-
medical professionals in the decision-making process. The problems posed
109 Dr. Vernon Mark, Director of Neurosurgical Service at Boston City Hospital, per-
forms stereotactic psychosurgery on patients with diagnosable temporal lobe epilepsy. The
hospital's Board of Trustees appointed Dr. David F. Allen, a psychiatrist, to establish and
chair a multidisciplinary committee for the purpose of reviewing Dr. Mark's patients. In
addition to Dr. Allen, the committee is composed of a medical doctor, a lawyer, a political
scientist, a minister, a medical student, a sociologist, a research biogeneticist and two rep-
resentatives from the local community. All of the members were chosen by the chairman
on the basis of experience, ability and willingness to attend meetings; and all serve with-
out compensation. Two consulting neurologists and an administrator were made available
to the committee.
110 Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 New Eng. J. Med. 465 (1972).
111'Physical Manipulation of the Brain, supra note 49, at 11 (remarks of Dr. Jos6 Del-
gado).
112 See Baker, Proposal for a Medical Malpractice Arbitration Plan Using Cleveland,
Ohio as a Model, Ill. Ins. L.J. 625 (1972); Henderson, Arbitration & Medical Services, 28
Arb. J. 15 (1975); Medical Malpractice (D. McDonald ed. 1971); Med. World News, Jan. 25,
1974, at 66.
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by psychosurgery and many other medical procedures are not capable of
resolution merely on the basis of medical considerations. It is for this
reason, and because of the tendency of peer review committees to act as
rubber stamps for the research protocols of members of their own pro-
fession, that significant nonmedical representation on review committees
should be assured.
Our experience with multidisciplinary committees, however, is so limited
that we must guard against their becoming a mechanism merely serving a
legitimizing function on the basis of inadequate consideration. The criteria
they employ and the decisions they reach should receive constant scrutiny
to assure that the rights of patients are being protected. For this purpose,
certain procedural safeguards should be built into the review process. First,
a prospective patient should always be represented by legal counsel during
committee proceedings and should have the right to cross-examine witnesses
and challenge documents presented against him. Second, the committees
should follow written standards for review, keep minutes of their meetings
and record' individual votes for every decision. The keeping of detailed
minutes and the recording of votes should act as a safeguard against the
diffusion of personal responsibility. 13 If the research proposal and the
consent of the patient are reviewed according to such procedures, indi-
viduals legally competent to give their informed consent should be allowed
to undergo psychosurgical operations.
Certain classes of prospective patients, however, require more stringent
protection. The confinement or status of prisoners, institutionalized mental
patients and children makes them especially vulnerable. Thus, in addition
to committee review and approval, there should be established a presump-
tion, rebuttable only in a court of law, that psychosurgery cannot be per-
formed on them. To rebut this presumption, the proponent of psycho-
surgery should be required to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt
that the patient's consent is both voluntary and informed, .and that there
is a reasonable probability that the procedure will produce the desired
effect. Although this proposal may amount to a de facto ban on the per-
formance of psychosurgery on members of these groups, it would permit
such operations under extremely compelling circumstances.
It is much too early in our experience with the mechanism of multi-
disciplinary review to reach any final conclusions with respect to its ability
to regulate potentially abusive medical procedures. It is clear, however,
that the current system of regulation is not only woefully inadequate, but
practically nonexistent. For the present, then, the establishment of review
committees along the lines suggested above offers a regulatory approach that
permits the medical community to proceed with necessary research on the
human brain without sacrificing the individual rights of patients.
113 Stanley Milgram's experiments have demonstrated that the fragmentation of respon-
sibility may lead average individuals to commit inhuman acts. Milgram, The Perils of
Obedience, Harper's, Dec. 1973, at 62. See also S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority (1974).
Thus, the proliferation of committees proposed by NIH may prove self-defeating. See text
accompanying notes 106-08 supra.
